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 The paper attempts to assess the role of the Constitutional Court of 
Indonesia in the process of consolidating democracy in the country. 
Examinations are made on the court’s decisions regarding dispute 
concerning jurisdiction among state organs. This paper argues that the 
Constitutional Court has not made a significant impact on the 
promotion of democracy. It is believed that the failure of the Court to 
consolidate democracy through its decisions regarding dispute 
concerning jurisdiction among state organs could be attributed to two 
main reasons. The first is due to the unclear concept of subjectum litis 
of the petitioners to have legal standing in the Constitutional Court, 
and the second is the lack of understanding of the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court. Due to uncertainties only, small numbers 
cases registered and heard by the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, 
most of the cases registered in the Court either been rejected or not been 
accepted by the judges. Despite the misgivings, the Court is still 
relevant and have certain contributions towards democracy. It has to a 
certain extent that enhances the working of checks and balances 
mechanisms among state organs. It is believed that the court could be 
more reliable and enhance its function in promoting democracy in the 
country by defining clearly classification of the subjectum litis as well 
as the objectum litis of the dispute that it may hear. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper is an attempt to evaluate the role of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in 
consolidating democracy through its decisions of the settlement of disputes concerning 
jurisdiction among state organs. To achieve this purpose, examination of its decisions 
shall be made. Since 2003 to 2013, twenty-four cases on disputes of authority among state 
organs had been registered at the Constitutional Court. The Court has decided twenty-
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three of the cases, and a case was ongoing at that time.1 The Constitutional Court decided 
to comply with the petition of one case, three cases were rejected, fifteen cases could not 
be accepted by the court and four petitions had been withdrew by the applicants. 
Initially in this writing some major decisions in the area of disputes concerning 
jurisdiction among state organs are summarized. This is followed by some achievements 
made by the Constitutional Court which are considered to have contribution in 
consolidating democracy in Indonesia, are made. A few obstacles and problems shall be 
highlighted towards the end followed by some recommendations. 
 
2.  The Constitutional Court: Power and Duties 
The Constitutional Court of Indonesia is a new state organ in Indonesian constitutional 
system as a result of the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. As an organ of 
constitution, the Court was designed to be the guardian of the Constitution as well as 
the sole interpreter of the Constitution. In conducting its constitutional duty, the 
Constitutional Court aims to uphold its institutional vision: Upholding Constitution in 
order to realize the rule of law state and democracy in the light of creating a civilized 
national life. 
The existence of the Constitutional Court has completed the judicial power, where 
previously that the implementing agencies of judicial power in Indonesia was only held 
by the Supreme Court.2 Based on the historical record of the founder, the existence of the 
court is influenced by South Korean Constitutional Court models very much. Most of 
the authority of Korean Constitutional Court is adopted in the judicial authority model 
of the Indonesian constitution.3 
The Indonesian Constitutional Court is an organ which was established after reform era. 
The Court has four functions, namely as the guardian of the constitution, the sole 
interpreter of the constitution, the enforcer of the constitution and the guardian of 
human rights. The four functions of the Constitutional Court are as stated in article 24C 
(1) the 1945 Constitution: 
1. To review the law against the 1945 Constitution; 
2. To decide authoritative dispute among state organ which the authorities given 
by the 1945 Constitution; 
3. To decide dissolution of political parties; and 
4. To decide dispute over the result of election. 
In addition to the above functions, the Constitutional Court has an obligation to give 
decision on the opinion of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (the DPR) whether a president 
and/or vice president have committed crimes, misdemeanors, or does not fulfill the 
requirements of being president and/or vice president as stated in the 1945 Constitution. 
As the guardian of the Constitution, the existence of the Court is to uphold the principle 
of checks and balances in Indonesian political system. In the concept of separation of 
powers, the principle of checks and balances between the authorities is considered as the 
                                               
1  Indonesian Constitutional Court, Rekapitulasi Perkara Sengketa Kewenangan Lembaga Negara. Available 
from: https://mkri.id/index.php?page=web.RekapSKLN. [Accessed: 7 March 2013]. 
2  Janpatar Simamore, (2015). “Comparison of Constitutional Court Authority Between Indonesia and 
South Korea”. Jurnal Dinamika Hukum, 15(3): 331-332 
3  Ibid. 
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essential and fundamental aspect. Constitutionalism means that the principle of 
separation of powers aims to limit the power of a state, so it is expected to avoid the 
domination of one power over another one, to avoid subjection and any arbitrary action 
by the authorities.4 To deal with that issue, the Constitutional Court has the authority to 
settle any disputes on constitutional cases. 
In the opinion of Ni’matul Huda5, it is common to encounter disputes between a state 
institution with another one, or between a state institution with a state commission, or 
between a local government with a central government. In the history of Indonesian 
constitution prior to the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution, there were no rules 
regarding the mechanism for resolving disputes over authority between state 
institutions. During that period, there was no precedent in the Indonesian constitutional 
practice regarding the settlement of disputes over authority between state institutions 
whose have authorities given by the constitution. It was only after the third amendment 
of the 1945 Constitution which adopted the establishment of a state institution of the 
Constitutional Court whose given an authority by the constitution to decide on an 
authority dispute between state institutions. 
The Constitutional Court is a separate court and does not form part of the hierarchy of 
ordinary courts. At the apex of hierarchy of ordinary court is the Supreme Court. The 
Constitutional Court is independent of and equal to the Supreme Court. Such new state 
government system is a system which basic ideas are intended to make Indonesia into a 
democratic constitutional state, as reflected in the provisions of Article 1 paragraph [2] 
and paragraph [3] of the 1945 Constitution.6 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court has drawn few positive responds as well 
as adverse comments from constitutional law experts. Some experts hoped that as an 
independent body, the Constitutional Court will have good impact on the working of 
state organs. There have been many abuses of power by state apparatus which cause the 
misconception that Indonesia is not based on rule of law. The newly established 
Constitutional Court is expected to safeguard the implementation of democracy based 
on the constitution.7 
Within a few years of the establishment of the Court, it was mandated to exercise one 
more function, that was to decide disputes over the results of local election. Such cases 
were previously handled by the Supreme Court. However, based on article 236 C Local 
Government Act 2008, it is stated that authority of deciding disputes over the results of 
local election is moved from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court.8 
Benny K. Harman9 asserted that the Constitutional Court has provided fresh air to the 
political life, democracy and national life of Indonesians. The role of the Constitutional 
                                               
4  Anna Trianingsih and Nuzul Qur’aini Mardiya, (2017). “An Analysis of Subjectum Litis and Objectum 
Litis on Dispute about the Authority of State Institution from the Verdicts of the Constitutional Court”. 
Constitutional Review, 3(2): 233 
5  Ni’matul Huda. (2017). “Potensi Sengketa Kewenangan Lembaga Negara dan Penyelesaiannya di 
Mahkamah Konstitusi”. JH Ius Quia Iustum, 24(2): 194-195 
6  Luthfi Widagdo Eddyono. (2018). “The Constitutional Court and Consolidation of Democracy in 
Indonesia”. Jurnal Konstitusi, 15(1): 9 
7  Lutu Dwi Prastanta. (2011). “Mahkamah Konstitusi dan Prinsip Judicial Independence dalam Sengketa 
Antar Lembaga Negara”. Jurnal Konstitusi, 4(2): 9 
8  Bambang Sutiyoso. (2009). Tata Cara Penyelesaian Sengketa di Lingkungan Mahkamah Konstitusi. Yogyakarta: 
UII Press, p.6 
9  Benny K. Harman. Peranan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Reformasi Hukum dari buku Menjaga Denyut Nadi 
Konstitusi: Refleksi Satu Tahun Mahkamah Konstitusi. Jakarta: Konstitusi Press, p.39 
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Court is exercised through checks and balances mechanism in the constitutional system. 
This mechanism may also overcome gap between lack of sense of justice in society and 
the practice of authoritarian regime and abuse of power in the level of state for long time, 
more over in Soeharto regime. 
Lindsey argues that the Constitutional Court, if it is effective, has radically potential role 
to transform relation between judiciary and legislative organ in Indonesia. This also may 
give a new mechanism of monitoring on behavior of the members of parliament as well 
as the president.10 
Other issue is the emergence of some state organs and state auxiliary organs which also 
implies disputes on jurisdiction among state organs and state auxiliary organs.11  In 
relation to this, the Constitutional Court has also jurisdiction to settle disputes 
concerning jurisdiction among state organs. Evaluation in this writing covers a critical 
analysis on the achievements as well as the obstacles faced by the Constitutional Court 
in settling dispute concerning jurisdiction among state organs. 
 
3. Major Decisions in the area of Disputes concerning Jurisdiction among State 
Organs 
After the 1998 political reform and amendment of Constitution, many new states 
auxiliary organ were established in Indonesia. These state auxiliary organs include 
independent state agencies such as Judicial Commission (KY), Election Commission and 
Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) and also part of executive branch such as 
Ombudsman Commission, National Police Commission, and Broadcasting 
Commission.12 One of implications of the establishment of the new state agencies is 
overlapping duties between the state auxiliary organs and the existing state organs, and 
between state auxiliary organ and state auxiliary organ. There is no clear coordination 
among the state auxiliary organs and the state organs. As a result, disputes concerning 
authority among state organs as well as the state agencies arisen. Selected decisions of 
the Constitutional Court which are selected from 23 cases that has been decided by the 
Constitutional Court. 
The decisions of the Constitutional Court in settling disputes concerning authority 
among state organs could be classified into four categories namely decisions rejected 
because the issue of the failure of the petitioners to prove the petitum or the petition are 
“obscure libel” 13 , decisions not accepted because the issue of subjectum litis 14 , the 
decisions not accepted because the issue of objectum litis15,  and the decision which been 
                                               
10  See also Butt, Simon and Tim Lindsey. (2009). The People’s Prosperity? Indonesian Constitutional 
Interpretation, Economic Reform, and Globalization, in John Gillespie & Randall Peerenboom (Eds), Regulation 
in Asia-Pushing Back on Globalization, London and New York: Routledge. See also Hazama. (2009). 
Constitutional Review and Democratic Consolidation: A Literature Review. A Paper presented at IDE 
Discussion Paper, Japan. 
11  Zainal Arifin Mochtar. (2012). Penataan Lembaga Negara Independen Setelah Perubahan Undang-Undang 
Dasar 1945. A summary of Ph.D Thesis. Universitas Gadjah Mada, p.3 
12  Zainal Arifin Mochtar. n.10, p.3 
13  See Decision No. 06/SKLN-II/2004 and Decision No. 2/SKLN-X/2012 
14  Se Decision No. 1/SKLN-X/2012, Decision No. 5/SKLN-V/2011, Decision No. 4/SKLN-IV/2011, 
Decision No. 26/SKLN-V/2007, Decision No. 030/SKLN-IV/2006, and Decision No. 002/SKLN-
IV/2006. 
15  See Decision No. 3/SKLN-XI/2013, Decision No. 1/SKLN-IX/2011, Decision No. 2/SKLN-IX/2011, 
Decision No. 1/SKLN-VIII/2010, Decision No. 26/ SKLN-V/2007, Decision No. 004/SKLN-IV/2006, 
DecisionNo. 027/SKLN-IV/2006. 
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accepted by the Court16.  Zainal argued that there are small numbers of decisions made 
by the Constitutional Court which are considered giving positive influence on the 
working of democratic consolidation in relation to disputes on jurisdiction among state 
organs. These are the decisions are as follows: 
 
3.1.  Rejected decisions 
3.1.1. Decision No. 2/SKLN-X/2012 on Dispute of Authority between President of Republic of 
Indonesia, Minister of Law and Human Rights and Minister of Finance vs the DPR of 
Republic of Indonesia and the BPK of Republic of Indonesia 
The main issue is whether the buying of 7% diverting shareholding of PT. 
Newmont Nusa Tenggara (PT. NNT) in 2010 is the constitutional right of the 
President in implementation of constitutional mandate without approval of DPR 
and BPK. However, it is compulsory to ask approval of the DPR in buying of 
shareholdings divestment of the PT. NNT in 2010 is considered as dilution of 
supervision function of the DPR and threaten the principle of separation of powers 
as stated in the 1945 Constitution. The object of dispute is the applicant (The 
President and the Ministers) argues that they have authority to buy 7% of 
shareholdings of divesting of PT. NNT. Approval of the DPR in this case has been 
considered by the applicant as an obstruction to perform its authority.  
The Constitutional Court decided to reject the petition of the applicant. The Court 
considered that although buying of 7% of diverting shareholding of PT. NNT by 
the President is within the constitutional authority of the applicant as the executive 
branch of the country. the applicant must fulfil some requirements such as (i) 
approval of DPR either through National Budget Proposal mechanism or specific 
approval, (ii) the mechanism has to be conducted transparently and responsibly 
for the sake of people’s prosperity, (iii) the program is under supervision of the 
DPR. Since the buying of 7% diverting shareholding of PT. NNT by the President 
was not listed specifically in the National Budget Proposal and did not have yet 
approval from the DPR, the Constitutional Court stated that the petition of the 
applicant is legally baseless and therefore it is rejected. 
Based on the decision, it can be noted that the Constitutional Court has given its 
contribution in keeping balance of powers between the President and the DPR. In 
this case, the Court argues that approval of the DPR is compulsory because it is 
kind of checks and balances mechanism that must be prevailed in the 
constitutional democratic state. 17  In other words, through this decision, the 
Constitutional Court has given its role in consolidating democracy in Indonesia 
through guaranteeing the working of checks and balances mechanism between the 
executive branch and legislature. 
3.1.2. Decision No. 068/SKLN-II/2004 on Disputes concerning Authority between Regional 
Representative Council (DPD) and the President of Republic of Indonesia 
Here the petitioner argued that the President had ignored its authority in the 
process of appointing of members of State Budget Audit (BPK) 2004-2009 and of 
retiring the members of the State Budget Audit 1999-2004. They further argued 
                                               
16  See Decision No. 3/SKLN-X/2012. 
17  Fatkhurrohman. (2004). Memahami Keberadaan Mahkamah Konstitusi di Indonesia. PT Citra Aditya Bakti, 
p.36 
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that the President must ask consideration of the DPD in appointing and retiring 
the members of the BPK as stated in the article 23F (1) of the 1945 Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court rejected the petition of the DPD because the DPD failed to 
prove their argument. The Court argued that the President had not ignored the 
authority of the DPD in the process of appointing new members of the BPK 2004-
2009 because at the time of process, the DPD had not been existed yet. The Court 
also further argued that the President has authority to proceed the process without 
involving the DPD because the law of the BPK had not enacted yet. Therefore, the 
President used other mechanism as stated by Article 1 of Transitional Provision of 
the 1945 Constitution which states that the prior institution and regulation still 
exist up to the enactment and establishment of the new regulation and institution 
 
3.2.  Accepted decisions 
3.2.1. Decision No. 3/SKLN-X/2012 on dispute on authority between Election Commission vs 
the DPRD Papua and Governor of Papua 
The main issue is whether the DPRP and the Governor of Papua has authority to 
take over the authority of the Election Commission in determining the registration 
period and verification of the local election for the Governor and Vice-Governor 
of Papua, except factual verification which is exercised by the Election 
Commission.  
The Constitutional Court decided to accept the petition of the applicant.  In this 
decision, the Constitutional Court considers regional government (the Governor 
and the DPRP) as the parties that have legal standing in dispute on authority 
among state organs.  In some decisions, the Constitutional Court has considered 
regional government (governor and the DPRD) as the state organ that could be a 
subject (subjectum litis) in application of disputes on authority among state organs. 
This is in line with the article 24C (1) of the 1945 Constitution that states that the 
state organ may have legal standing in application of disputes on authority among 
state organs if its authority (objectum litis) meets the requirement as written in the 
1945 Constitution that the organ has authority given by the Constitution18.  
The Constitutional Court considered that the authority to determine the period 
and registration of governor election in Papua is not part of the special autonomy 
of Papua. Therefore, the DPRP and the Governor of Papua cannot take over the 
authority of the Election Commission in determining schedule and registration of 
governor election in Papua. 
However, in the name of legal utility, the Court stated that the Election 
Commission must proceed the process of registration of candidate of Governor of 
Papua and accepted the candidates that has been registered by the DPRP and the 
Governor because the DPRP and the Governor has conducted some registration 
and verification of candidate Governor of Papua. The Court also commanded the 
Election Commission to extend the registration period for other candidate of 
Governor of Papua (in 30 days).  
In this case, the Constitutional Court has shown its function as facilitator and 
mediator of conflict among the Election Commission, the DPRP, and the Governor. 
In other words, the Court has played an important role in creating a conducive 
                                               
18  See also Decision No. 1/SKLN-VIII/2010 
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political environment in the process of Governor election in Papua. It is actually 
part of significant contribution in consolidating democracy in the level of local 
election in Papua. 
 
3.3.  Not accepted decisions due to subjectum litis 
3.3.1. Decision No. 1/SKLN-X/2012 on dispute on authority between the Minister of Home 
Affairs vs Election Commission and Independent Election Commission in Aceh and 
Governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusuf 
The main issue is whether the Minister of Home Affairs has authority to postpone 
the step of the local election and re-open for registration of candidacy.  
The Constitutional Court decided that the Independent Election Commission of 
Aceh is allowed to continue the step of the local election and re-open for 
registration of new candidate within 7 days after the decision (Putusan Sela) is 
announced19.  The Court argued that if the Independent Election Commission of 
Aceh would not extend schedule for registration of candidate, it would ignore 
political right of other candidates to register to be candidate of Governor. This 
situation would potentially disturb local election process and the working of 
government which produced by the local election in Aceh. 
This decision shows that the Constitutional Court tries to facilitate a more 
conducive political situation in Aceh since Aceh is recognized as one of the 
provinces with unstable political situation. In term of Aceh, it is needing a very 
extra effort to create a better political stability after the peaceful agreement 
between the Central Government and the Aceh Movement for Independence 
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). In other words, at the regional level, Aceh is in the process 
of democratic consolidation. Therefore, giving more opportunity to the new 
candidate in the local election could be a way to strengthen the process of 
democratic consolidation in Aceh. 
In the final decision, the Constitutional Court rejected the petition of the Minister 
of Home Affairs. The Court argued that the Minister of Home Affairs could not 
fulfil as the subject of the dispute because the Minister of Home Affairs might not 
independently be subject of dispute because the Minister of Home Affairs is part 
of the President Deputy which could not be the subject independently. 
Through the decision, the Court repeatedly asserted that the petitioners in the 
disputes concerning authority among state organs must fulfil two requirements 
i.e. subjectum litis and objectum litis. The Court also warned the government to be 
more careful in bringing disputes in the Constitutional Court since the subjectum 
litis and objectum litis are the main important issues for the Constitutional Court in 
considering the disputes. 
3.3.2. Decision No. 030/SKLN-IV/2006 on dispute on authority between Indonesian 
Broadcasting Commission (KPI) and President Republic of Indonesia qq. Minister of 
Communication and Information 
The main point of the petition is the KPI considered that the Minister of 
Communication and Information has taken, reduced, prevented, and ignored the 
authority of the KPI as the state organ which has responsibility to issue permit and 
                                               
19  Preliminary Decision (Putusan Sela) No. 108/PHPU.D-IX/2011 
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make regulation on “broadcasting”. As an independent commission, the KPI 
argued that they have responsibility in developing, enforcing and fulfilling the 
rights of citizen as stated in article 28F of the 1945 Constitution20.  
The Constitutional Court rejected the petition of the applicant because the Court 
argued that the KPI had no legal standing as a subject of dispute. The Court further 
argued that the KPI is an organ which is given the authority by the 1945 
Constitution. The KPI is an organ which is given authority by the act. 
3.3.3. Decision No. 002/SKLN-IV/2006 on dispute on authority between Badrul Kamal and 
Syihabuddin Ahmad (Candidate for Mayor in Depok, West Java) and Election Commission 
of Depok, West Java 
The main issue is whether the Supreme Court has authority to try and decide a 
dispute of the result of local election in Depok which has decided final and binding 
the High Court of Bandung, West Java. The Supreme Court finally received the 
petition of Peninjauan Kembali from the Election Commission of Depok and 
decided Nurhmahmudi Ismail as the winner in the local election of Depok.  
The Constitutional Court stated that the petition of the applicant could not be 
accepted (niet ontvankelijk verklaard) because the subjectum litis and objectum litis of 
the petition could not be fulfilled. The Court considered that KPUD Depok is not 
the organ which has authority from the 1945 Constitution. It has delegation 
authority from Regional Government Act. Therefore, the Court considered that it 
is not part of constitutional disputes. 
Through the decision, the Constitutional Court has given an important role in 
creating legal certainty on the result of local election in Depok, Indonesia. By 
having the decision, the Court has finished a long dispute between the two 
candidates of Mayor in Depok which threatens the political stability in the region. 
Again, the Court has played positive contribution in consolidating democracy in 
the Depok Municipality. 
 
3.4.  Not accepted decisions due to objectum litis 
3.4.1. Decision No. 2/SKLN-IX/2011 on dispute on authority between Andi Harahap (the Regent 
of Penajam Paser Utara) and Nanang Ali (the Chairman of Penajam Paser Utara) vs 
Minister of Forest of the Republic of Indonesia 
The applicant in this case argued that they have authority in managing the wealth 
of the region. However, they could not exercise the authority since the Minister of 
Forest has prevented (obstructed, reduced and ignored). The Minister of Forest 
was considered as the representative of the Central Government, has ignored the 
existence of the new district, Penajam Paser Utara in determining Special Zone for 
Forest of Tanaman.  
The Minister of Forest has decided through its decree that Taman Hutan Raya 
Bukit Soeharto which is in the District of Penajam Paser Utara, East Borneo as 
                                               
20  Article 28F of the 1945 Constitution states that “every person shall have the rights to communicate and 
to obtain information for the purpose of the development of his/herself and social environment, and 
shall have the rights to seek, obtain, possess, store, process and convey information by employing all 
available types of channels”. 
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Protecting Forest. However, the Governor has decided the area of housing for 
transmigration. 
The Constitutional Court stated that the petition of the applicant could not be 
accepted (niet ontvankelijk verklaard). Although the applicant is considered as the 
subjectum litis in the Court, the Court argued that there are not constitutional 
disputes between the applicant and the Minister of Forest because based on the 
1945 Constitution and Law No. 41 of 1999, the Central Government c.q. Minister of 
Forest has authority to manage and explore the natural resource for the sake of 
people’s prosperity21.  
In this decision, the Court has determined an important thing in the light of 
consolidating democracy i.e. the Court has accepted the position of local 
government as the subjectum litis in case of disputes on jurisdiction among the state 
organs. Admitting the subjectum litis of the local government in bringing a case to 
the Court is important in the light of how create more democratic, accountable and 
transparent policy between the Central Government and local government. 
3.4.2. Decision No. 26/SKLN-V/2007 on Dispute between Election Commission of Aceh 
Tenggara Regency and Local Parliament of Aceh Tenggara Regency vs Independent 
Election Commission of Province of Aceh and the Governor of Aceh, and President 
Republic of Indonesia c.q. Minister of home Affairs. 
The issue of this petition is the petitioners argued that the defendant I and II has 
taken over the authority of the petitioners in determining and issuing official 
document on the Result of Recapitulation of Election of Regent in Aceh Tenggara. 
The Constitutional Court did not accept the petition of the Petitioners because the 
Petitioners and Defendant I are the organs which have authority given by the laws, 
the Court argued that the dispute is not a dispute concerning authority among 
state organs as mentioned by Article 24C (1) of the 1945 Constitution, and Article 
61 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act, and Article 2 (1) of the Constitutional Court 
Regulation No. 08/PMK/2006. In other words, the petitioners failed to fulfil 
objectum litis of the petition. 
3.4.3. Decision No. 004/SKLN-IV/2006 on Disputes between Drs. Saleh Manaf, Regent of Bekasi 
Regency, West Java and Drs. Solihin Sari, Vice Regent of Bekasi Regency, West Java vs 
the President Republic of Indonesia, Minister of Home Affais, and Local Parliament of 
Bekasi Regency. 
This is called as “the landmark decision of the Constitutional Court” relating to 
the definition of “objectum litis” which considered giving limitation to the 
petitioners. This limitation of objectum litis of disputes which is later on 
implemented by the Constitutional Court in the next decisions. 
In this decision, the Court did not accept the position of the Regent and the Vice 
Regent as the subject of the petition because based on the objectum litis of the 
petition, the authority which questioned by the petitioners is not part of the 
authority which is given the 1945 Constitution. 
 
 
                                               
21  Article 33 (3) of the 1945 Constitution and Article 4 (1) of Law No. 41 of 1999 on Forest. 
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In this decision, the Court gives some requirements of the objectum litis, namely: 
a. The authority of the state organs given by the Constitution (explicitly); 
b. The authority could be implicitly delegated by the Constitution and further 
regulated by laws; 
c. There is a proper and necessary correlation between the authority implicitly 
stated in the Constitution and the laws which further regulate the authority22. 
However, in case of the Regent and Vice Regent vs President-Minister of Home 
Affairs-Bekasi District Parliament, the Constitutional Court argued that Article 29 
to 33 of Law No. 32 of 2004 do not mention textually and implicitly or there is no 
a proper and necessary correlation with the main authoritative provision from the 
1945 Constitution. Accordingly, article 29 to 33 of the Law No. 32 of 2004 could not 
be the legal basis of the petitioner as objectum litis of the petition. Therefore, the 
Court did not accept the petition of the petitioner. 
Hence, talking about the understanding of state organ definition, the first theory is 
adopted from Hans Kelsen perspective about The Concept of the State Organ in his book 
entitled General Theory of Law and State as he explained that “whoever fulfills a function 
determined by the legal order is an organ”. Whoever runs a function which has been 
regulated by a legal order is an organ. 23 Based on this explanation, a state institution is 
not always organic. In addition, all institution that prescribed by law can also be called 
as state institution, as long as its functions are norm creating and/or norm applying.24 
Another concept of state organ definition, according to Jimly Asshiddiqie 25 , is a 
substantial concept. Jimly emphasized that the narrow definition of state organ has 3 
categories as follows: 
1. The organs are chosen or appointed to occupy a certain position or function; 
2. The function is carried out as the main authority or even legally exclusive; and 
3. Because of its function, these state organs are funded by the state. 
Based on the decisions, it can be analyzed that since 2003 to 2013 there are only small 
number of cases on disputes concerning authority among state organs registered in the 
Constitutional Court. Furthermore, most cases which registered to the Court were 
rejected or not accepted by the Court due to the issue of subjectum litis and or objectum 
litis. The only case that accepted by the Court is the case of Election Commission vs the 
DPRD and Governor of Papua. In this case, the petitioners were able to fulfil the 
subjectum litis and objectum litis of petition, and therefore the Court decided that Election 
Commission has to proceed the process of registration of candidate of Governor of 
Papua and accepted the candidates that has been registered by the DPRP and the 
Governor because the DPRP and the Governor has conducted some registration and 
                                               
22  See further Decision No. 004/SKLN-IV/2006, at 90-95. 
23  Raisul Muttaqien. (2006). Teori Umum Tentang Hukum dan Negara. Bandung: Nusamedia dan Nuansa, 
p.276-277 
24  Anna Triningsih and Nuzul Qur’aini Mardiya. (2017). “Interpretation of State Institutions and Disputes 
of State Institution in Settlement of Disputes Authorities of State Institutions”. Jurnal Konstitusi, 14(4): 
785 
25  Jimly Asshiddiqie. (2004). Perkembangan Ketatanegaraan Pasca Perubahan UUD 1945 dan Tantangan 
Pembaharuan Pendidikan Hukum Indonesia, an article which was presented on a National Seminar 
“Perkembangan Ketatanegaraan Pasca Perubahan UUD dan Lokakarya Pembaharuan Kurikulum Pendidikat 
Tinggi Hukum di Indonesia”, held by Asosiasi Pengajar HTN dan HAN. Jakarta, 7th of September 2004, 
p.32 
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verification of candidate Governor of Papua. The Court also commanded the Election 
Commission to extend the registration period for other candidate of Governor of Papua 
(in 30 days)26. 
There are two main reasons behind rejection of the Constitutional Court relating to the 
most petitions, firstly, the petitioners failed to fulfil the requirement of being the subject 
of the disputes in the Constitutional Court. Regarding the subjectum litis issue, Maruarar 
argues that definition of subjectum litis which is confined to formalism and structural 
analysis on state organs has prompted the failure of the Constitutional Court in guarding 
the 1945 Constitution in settling disputes concerning authority among state organs as 
mandated by the 1945 Constitution27. 
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court derived article 24C of the 1945 Constitution 
and article 61 of the Constitutional Court Act into article 2 (1) of Regulation No. 
08/PMK/2006 which states that the state organs which may be the subject of the 
disputes concerning authority of state organs are: 
a. The People's Representative Council; 
b. The Regional Representative Council;  
c. The People's Consultative Assembly; 
d. President; 
e. The Audit Board of Indonesia; 
f. Regional Government; or  
g. Any other state organs whose powers given by the 1945 Constitution. 
Phrase “whose powers given by the 1945 Constitution” as stated by article 61 (1) of the 
Constitutional Court Act means “attributive authority” which is delegated by the 1945 
Constitution, not any authority delegated by any regulations below the 1945 
Constitution 28 . Classification of disputes as mentioned in the Article 61 (1) of the 
Constitutional Court consists two meanings, i.e. first, some state organs have been 
clearly named in the article, second, point g of the article give a more facultative 
meaning. Which state organs beside 6 state organs that have been clearly stated in the 
article that have authority to bring petition to the Constitutional Court? It is not 
definitely answered. It leaves to the judges of the Constitutional Court to interpret the 
classification of other organs as mentioned in point g. 
Secondly, limitation of objectum litis which considered by the Court as the objects that 
the Court has authority to decide. By this limitation, some petitions are considered by 
the Court that there are no disputes on authority among state organs which the authority 
given by the 1945 Constitution. The Court argued that the disputes which would be 
settled by the Court are the disputes on authority among state organs whose powers 
given by the 1945 Constitution. However, the 1945 Constitution and the Constitutional 







                                               
26  See further Decision No. 3/SKLN-X/2012. 
27  See Luthfi Widagdo Eddyono, n. 418, p.33-34 
28  Lukman Hakim. (2010). “Sengketa Kewenangan Kelembagaan Negara dan Penataannya dalam 
Kerangka Sistem Hukum Nasional”. Jurnal Yustisia. 80(21), p.7 
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Table 1. Requirements of Disputes on Jurisdiction among State Organs. 
No. Position State Organs 
1. Subjectum Litis 
(Petitioners or 
Defendant) 
Article 2 (1) of the Constitutional Court Regulation No. 
8/PMK/2006 states that state organs that can be petitioners 
or defendants in disputes concerning jurisdiction among 
state organs, i.e.: 
a. People’s Representative Council (DPR) 
b. Regional Representative Council (DPD) 
c. People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
d. President 
e. Audit Board  
f. Regional Government, or 
g. Any organs whose powers given by the 1945 
Constitution. 
2. Objectum Litis 
(Object of Disputes) 
Article 2 (2) states that the jurisdiction as stated in the article 
2 (1) is the jurisdiction given by the 1945 Constitution. 
Source: Constitutional Court Regulation No. 8/PMK/2006 
 
The Constitutional Court has tried to give a further explanation on the meaning of the 
objectum litis through its Decision No. 004/SKLN-IV/2006. This could be named as “the 
landmark decision of the Constitutional Court” relating to the definition of “objectum 
litis” which considered giving limitation to the petitioners. This limitation of objectum 
litis of disputes which later implemented in the next decisions. In this decision, the Court 
gives some requirements of the objectum litis, namely: 
a. The authority of the state organs given by the Constitution (explicitly); 
b. The authority could be implicitly delegated by the Constitution and further 
regulated by laws; 
c. There is a proper and necessary correlation between the authority implicitly 
stated in the Constitution and the laws which further regulate the authority.29 
However, in case of the Regent and Vice Regent vs President-Minister of Home Affairs-
Bekasi District Parliament, the Constitutional Court argued that Article 29 to 33 of Law 
No. 32 of 2004 do not mention textually and implicitly or there is no a proper and 
necessary correlation with the main authoritative provision from the 1945 Constitution. 
Accordingly, article 29 to 33 of the Law No. 32 of 2004 could not be the legal basis of the 
petitioner as objectum litis of the petition. Therefore, the Court did not accept the petition 
of the petitioner. 
It is worthy noted that there are two judges of the Constitutional Court who gave 
dissenting opinion in this decision. Abdul Mukhtie Fajar, for instance, argued that the 
Regent/Vice Regent of District of Bekasi is one of the state organs which named in 
Article 18 (4) of the 1945 Constitution and they have constitutional authority as stated 
by Article 18 (2), (5) and (6) of the 1945 Constitution, equal to Local Parliament of Bekasi. 
 
                                               
29  See further Decision No. 004/SKLN-IV/2006, p.90-95. 
Hasanuddin Law Rev. 5(2): 159-179 
171 
 
Recognition of the Regent/Vice Regent or Mayor/Vice Mayor as part of organ which 
have constitutional authority implicitly could also be found in the Decision of the 
Constitutional Court No. 002/SKLN-IV/2006. Based on the argument, Abdul Mukhtie 
Fajar argued that the case brought by the Regent/Vice Regent is dispute concerning 
constitutional authority of the petitioners as stated in the Article 24C of (1) of the 1945 
Constitution and the Constitutional Court Act. He further added that the existence of 
the Constitutional Court as asserted in the general explanation of the Constitutional 
Court Act is to maintain the working of a stable government. The action taken by 
President had disturbed stability of Government of Bekasi that has been run well by the 
petitioners in two years30. 
Maruarar Siahaan also asserted that if the Constitutional Court uses a narrow or strict 
interpretation in settling disputes among state organ, the Court cannot uphold the 
Constitution. He further argued that the judges of the Constitutional Court do not be 
trapped into the original intent of the framers of the Constitution. He provokes judges 
of the Constitutional Court to response more about the dynamic progress of 
constitutional system and demand of the practice of the unknown future31. Relating to 
the petition, Maruarar argued that the petitioners are the state organs whose authority 
given by the 1945 Constitution although detail authority of the petitioners derivatively 
regulated in the law32. Maruarar proposes new definition, that is “the disputes in the 
constitutional system as the result of one state organ exercises its authority given by the 
1945 Constitution, has abolished, created lost and disturbed other state organ’s 
authority33. 
In relation to this discourse, the writer agrees with these two dissenting opinions as 
propounded by Abdul Mukhtie Fajar and Maruarar Siahaan. Both judges are at the same 
points that the Constitutional Court has not to be trapped into the original intent of the 
1945 Constitution relating to Article 24C (1) of the 1945 Constitution while ignoring two 
things, i.e. first, the existence of the Constitutional Court as asserted in the general 
explanation of the Constitutional Court Act is to maintain the working of a stable 
government. The action taken by President had disturbed stability of Government of 
Bekasi that has been run well by the petitioners in two years.  
Second, judges of the Constitutional Court have to response more about the dynamic 
progress of constitutional system and demand of the practice of the unknown future. If 
the Court rejects the petition, there would be an ignorance of the constitutional rights of 
the Regent as well as the Vice-Regent or there would be also vacuum of law in settling 
disputes concerning authority among the state organs34. 
Regarding to the dispute on authority in South Korea, there is no limitation of the state 
institutions dispute on authority whether it must be granted by the Constitution or not. 
However, the South Korean Constitutional Court Act gives a definitive state institution 
that have legal standing to be the party in the dispute on jurisdiction among the state 
                                               
30  Ibid, p.103-106 
31  Ibid, p.107 
32  Ibid, p.110 
33  Ibid, p.112 
34  Maruarar argued that a break through has to be done by the Constitutional Court  in order to uphold 
the Constitution and protect constitutional right of a regent and vice-regent from any disturbances of 
other organs. Maruarar further defensed that this break through is important because the Constitutional 
Court has no authority to decise petition regarding constitutional complaints of the citizen. Therefore, it 
is important to be noted that it is better for the Constitutional Court to have authority in deciding 
constitutional complaints in order to guarante te rights of citizen from any violations. 
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organs. This is in contrary to Indonesian dispute settlement authority between state 
institutions, where the disputed authority only which is given by the Constitution. 
Constitutional Court of South Korea in maintaining dispute settlement on authority of 
state institutions can freeze the activity of state agencies were sued until the final verdict 
issued by the court35. As for maintaining the authority, the Constitutional Court of South 
Korea adopted a substantive and procedural process36. 
Article 62 of the Constitutional Court Act of South Korea classifies their classification of 
competent disputes as Table 2. 
Table 2. Classification of Subjectum Litis and Objectum Litis in South Korea 
No. Position State Organs 
1. Subjectum 
Litis 
Article 62 of the Constitutional Court Act classifies some types of 
competent disputes, i.e.: 
1. Disputes between state agencies: National Assembly, The 
Executive, ordinary courts, and the National Election 
Commission. 
2. Disputes between a state agency and a local government: 
a. Between the Executive and the Special Metropolitan City, 
Metropolitan City or Province; and 
b. Between the Executive and the City/County or District 
which is a local government (Self-governing District) 
3. Disputes between local governments: 
a. Between the Special Metropolitan City, Metropolitan City 
or Province; 
b. Between the City/County or Self-governing District; 
Between the Special Metropolitan City, Metropolitan City or Province 
and the City/County, or Self-governing District. 
2. Objectum Litis Competent Disputes 
Source: South Korean Constitutional Court Act 
 
1. Adjudication on competence disputes between state agencies: adjudication on 
competent dispute between the National Assembly, the Executive, ordinary 
courts and the National Election Commission; 
2. Adjudication on competence dispute between a state agency and a local 
government: 
a) Adjudication on competence dispute between the executive and the Special 
Metropolitan City, Metropolitan City or Province; and 
b) Adjudication on competence dispute between the Executive and the 
City/County or District which is a local government (hereinafter referred to 
as a “Self-governing District”). 
 
                                               
35  Muchamad Ali Safa’at, et.al. (2010). Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi. Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal 
Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia in cooperation with Assosiasi Pengajar Hukum Acara 
Mahkamah Konstitusi, p.154 
36  Jibong Lim. (2006). “Korean Constitutional Court and Due Process Clause”. Journal of Korean Law, 6(1): 
11 
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3. Adjudication on competence dispute between local governments: 
a) Adjudication on competence dispute between the Special Metropolitan City, 
Metropolitan City or Province; 
b) Adjudication on competence dispute between the City/County or Self-
governing District; and 
c) Adjudication on competence dispute between the Special Metropolitan City, 
Metropolitan City or Province and the City, County, or Self-governing 
District. 
In addition, the Constitutional Court failed to understand the significant changes of the 
state organs in Indonesia after four amendments of the 1945 Constitution. One of the 
significant changes is the shifting of state organ’s paradigm which is called by Jimly 
Asshiddiqie from vertical -hierarchical to horizontal-equal among state organ and the 
emergence of new state auxiliary organs 37  such as Judicial Commission, Election 
Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission, Ombudsman Commission etc. However, 
even after amendments of the 1945 Constitution, the 1945 Constitution does not explain 
clearly the concept of state organ.  
In 1997, at least there were around 21 non-governmental institutions and 31 extra- 
structural institutions under the President as well as the ministers. After the political 
reform in 1998, there are more state agencies which are established by the President or 
by laws38.  In this context, there is a question whether normative sources of authority of 
the state agencies are automatically determine its legal status in the hierarchy of state 
organs39 and implies on its legal standing in the Constitutional Court as the subject. 
The explanation of other state organs which are given authority by the 1945 Constitution 
as the subject of the disputes shows that the applicants are not only the previous state 
organs that are clearly stated, but there are also other state organs. The extensive 
meaning of the state organs is also asserted by the Decision of the Constitutional Court 
No. 004/SKLN-IV/2006 on12 July 2006 which states “in determining the substance and 
limitation of authority which could be objectum litis  of dispute on authority of state 
organs, the Constitutional Court does not merely interpret through textual approach on 
the text of the provisions in the 1945 Constitution, but the Constitutional Court also 
considers any possibilities of implicit authority in particular main authority or necessary 
and proper authority in exercising of the main authority40. 
On the other hand, according to Jimly Asshiddiqie, there are 28 state organs that are 
explicitly and implicitly recognized in the 1945 Constitution. The authority of these state 
organs, however, are regulated in different types of legislation such as it is clearly stated 
                                               
37  Zainal Arifin Mochtar stated in his conclusion of the thesis that after the 1998 political reform, there is  a 
new trend in Indonesia, that is a inflation of state auxiliary organs. Although it is a common trends in 
many countries, in Indonesia, there is no clear and intergrated plan in establishing the state auxiliary 
organs. Therefore, he proposes reposition or restructurization of the state auxiliary organs is needed. See 
further Zainal Arifin Mochtar, n. 408, p.91 
38  Zainal Arifin Mochtar, n. 408, p.2-3 
39  Lukman Hakim. (2010). “Sengketa Kewenangan Kelembagaan Negara dan Penataannya Dalam 
Kerangka Sistem Hukum Nasional”. Jurnal Hukum Justicia Fakultas Hukum Universitas Sebelas Maret 
Surakarta. 80 
40  Lukman Hakim, n. 414, p.82. 
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in the 1945 Constitution or it is further regulated in laws. These are the state organs as 
follow:41 
1. People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR),  
2. House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR), 
3. Regional Repesentative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah/DPD), 
4. President and Vice-President (Presiden and Wakil Presiden) 
5. Advisory Council of President (Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden) 
6. Ministries (Kementerian Negara) 
7. Ambassadors (Duta) 
8. Counsel (Konsul)  
9. Provincial Government (Governor and the Regional House of Representative) 
10. District Government (Regent and the Regional House of Representative)  
11. Municipality Government (Mayor and the Regional House of Representative) 
12. Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU) 
13. Central Bank (Bank Sentral) 
14. Supreme Audit Boadr (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan/BPK) 
15. Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung/MA) 
16. Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi/MK) 
17. Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial/KY) 
18. National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI) 
19. Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia) 
20. Special Autonomy Government (Pemerintah Daerah Khusus or Istimewa) 
21. Unity of Communities Based on Adat Law (Kesatuan Masyarakat Hukum Adat) 
So far, the Constitutional Court’s decisions have been very consistent in determining 
state institutions that can become an applicants or defendants in resolving the dispute 
on authority of state institutions refer to 2 conditions of Subjectum Litis and Objectum 
Litis. Both conditions are applied in absolute cumulative terms, not choices. In short, 
even if the Subjectum Litis is fulfilled, but the Objectum Litis is not, then, the petition is 
always “rejected”42. However, it becomes a problem when these 2 conditions turn to be 
a hindrance for petitioners. 
Having this strict definition of the state organs, therefore, it is hard for petitioners to 
fulfil the legal standing in the Constitutional Court. Zainal Arifin Mochtar added that 
limitation of state organs which made by the Court has resulted small number of cases 
brought to the Court. In fact, he further argues that after the political reform in 1998, 
there are many new state organs which are stated in the Constitution that exist and 
exercise the interests of the citizens such as Anti-Corruption Commission, Human Right 
Commission, Broadcasting Commission. Hence, Zainal asserts that in term of settling 
disputes concerning authority of state organs, the Court does not yet take significant role 
in consolidating democracy in Indonesia.43 
 
                                               
41  Jimly Asshidiqie. (2006). Sengketa Kewenangan Konstitusional Lembaga Negara. Jakarta: Konstitusi Press & 
PT Syaamil Cipta Media, p.15 
42  Sulistiya Eka Lestari. (2014). “Penyelesaian Sengketa Kewenangan Antar Lembaga Negara Oleh 
Mahkamah Konstitusi”. Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, 10(19): 45 
43  Interview with Dr. Zainal Arifin Mochtar, a constitutional law expert from Gadjah Mada University, 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, June 2nd, 2014. 
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4.  Achievements of the Constitutional Court in the Consolidating of Democracy 
through Settlement of Disputes concerning Jurisdiction among State Organs 
From the foregoing passages on the above decisions, it may draw some relevant points 
that the Constitutional Court has given contribution to the consolidation of democracy 
through its decisions. However, due to small numbers of cases registered, Constitutional 
Court had not taken significant role in settling disputes among state organs. Some 
achievements could be noted as follows: 
(i) Constitutional Court has successfully played as a state mediator or a facilitator for 
any disputes concerning jurisdiction of state organs. Some decisions have been 
made in settling disputes concerning jurisdiction among state organs. This 
function is important because the members of the DPR are sometimes enacted laws 
which lead conflicts among state organs. In addition, a state organ also may issue 
decree which disturb other state organs’ authorities. 
(ii) Based on the decisions, it can be noted that the Constitutional Court has given its 
contribution in keeping balance of powers between the President and the DPR. In 
this case, the Court argues that approval of the DPR is compulsory because it is 
kind of checks and balances mechanism that has to be prevailed in the 
constitutional democratic state. In other words, through this decision, the 
Constitutional Court has significant role in consolidating democracy in Indonesia. 
(iii) The Constitutional Court, through its decisions, has also played an important role 
in creating a conducive political environment in the process of Governor election 
in some regions such as Papua, Aceh and Depok. It is part of significant 
contribution in consolidating democracy in the level of local election in some 
regions. 
Through the decisions, the Constitutional Court has given an important role in 
creating legal certainty on the result of local election in Depok, Indonesia. By 
having the decision, the Court has finished a long dispute between the two 
candidates of Mayor in Depok which threatens the political stability in the region. 
Again, the Court has played positive contribution in consolidating democracy in 
the Depok Municipality 
(iv) The Court has also determined an important thing in the light of consolidating 
democracy i.e. the Court has accepted the position of local government as the 
subjectum litis in case of disputes on jurisdiction among the state organs as 
happened in Decision No. 2/SKLN-IX/2011 on dispute on authority between 
Andi Harahap (the Regent of Penajam Paser Utara) and Nanang Ali (the Chairman 
of Penajam Paser Utara) vs Minister of Forest of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Admitting the subjectum litis of the local government in bringing a case to the Court 
is important in the light of how create more democratic, accountable and 
transparent policy between the Central Government and local government. 
 
5.  Problems Facing the Settlement of Disputes concerning the Conflict of Jurisdiction 
among State Organs 
Ahmad Roestandi,44 a former judge at the Constitutional Court, explains that in the 1945 
Constitution (after amendments), it does not elaborate in detail the meaning of state 
organs and which state organs that have legal standing to bring petition to the 
                                               
44  Luthfi Widagdo Eddyono. (2010). “Penyelesaian Sengketa Kewenangan Lembaga Negara oleh 
Mahkamah Konstitusi”. Jurnal Konstitusi. 7(3), p.19 
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Constitutional Court. He further considers there are only 30 state organs that named or 
given authority by the Constitutional Court, namely MPR, DPR, DPD, BPK, President, 
Vice President, Ministers, National Army, Council of Advisors of the President, 
Ambassador, Consul, Election Commission, Central of Bank, the Supreme Court, the 
Constitutional Court, the Judicial Commission, any other bodies related to the judiciary, 
such Attorney General, Provinces, Governor, Provincial Parliament, District 
Government, District Parliament, Municipality, Mayor, Municipality Parliament, Special 
Local Government, Adat Society, and the political party45. 
Abdul Mukhtie Fajar, another former judge at the Constitutional Court further argues 
that since the 1945 Constitution and Constitutional Court Act 2004 do not explain the 
meaning and the scope of state organs, it has resulted some interpretations among judges 
and scholars. He categorizes three kinds of interpretation i.e. first, wide interpretation 
which means every state organ which are named in the 1945 Constitution. Second, 
moderate interpretation which confines state organs that are recognized as the highest 
state organs (MPR) and high state organs (President, DPR, DPD, BPK, MA and MK). 
Third, narrow interpretation which assumes the subject of disputes only are DPR, DPD 
and President (interpretation of Article 67 of the Constitutional Court Act)46. 
Jimly Asshiddiqie elaborates that at least, there are 34 state organs that named the 
existence in the 1945 Constitution. Compared to Achmad Roestandi, Jimly derives some 
state organs into more detail categories such Ministers and National Army47. These show 
that there is different interpretation among scholars and former judges on what are the 
state organs that may have legal standing to bring dispute to the Constitutional Court. 
Secondly, lack of understanding of the meaning of constitutional disputes on jurisdiction 
among petitioners that implies most petitioners tend to use judicial review although it is 
a constitutional dispute on jurisdiction. Jimly Asshiddiqie argues in his book that in fact 
there are some constitutional disputes state organs. However, the parties did not use 
constitutional disputes to settle the issues. Jimly Asshiddiqie gives some examples i.e. 
disputes between South Celebes Province and Central Government on burdening them 
to provide two years budget for a new province, West Celebes48. Another case is the 
judicial review of Law No. 4 of 2004 on Judiciary and Law No. 22 of 2004 on Judicial 
Commission49. This judicial review is basically disputes concerning authority among the 
Supreme Court and Judicial Commission. 
                                               
45  Ibid, p.20-22 
46  Ibid, p.20. In his opinion, if it is used wide interpretation, there are aroung 13 state organs i.e. MPR, 
President, DPR, DPD, MA, MK, Central Bank of Indonesia, KPU, Regional Government, Judicial 
Commission, BPK, TNI and Police. In term of using moderate interpretation, there are only 7 state organs 
i.e. MPR, President, DPR, DPD, BPK, MA and MK. In a narrow interpretation, there are only  3 state 
organs i.e. DPR, DPD and the President. However, some scholars Ahmad Roestandi and Jimly 
Asshiddiqie)  also have different opinion on numbers of the state organs which have legal standin to 
bring petitions to the Constitutional Court. These different opinions assert that the meaning and scope 
of state organ are unclear, even among judges at the Constitutional Court. 
47  See Jimly Asshiddiqie. (2010). Perkembangan dan Konsolidasi Lembaga Negara Pasca Reformasi. Jakarta: 
Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi RI, p.57-59 
48  Jimly Asshiddiqie. n. 39, p.19 
49  See further The Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia Decision No. 005/PUU-IV/2006. In this 
decision, the judges of the Supreme Court argued that the Judicial Commission has taken over their 
authority in supervising the judges. The Constitutional Court nullified the authority of the Judicial 
Commission in supervising the judges because the Court considered that both laws has brought about 
legal uncertainty. 
Hasanuddin Law Rev. 5(2): 159-179 
177 
 
Jimly Asshiddiqie further explains that at the beginning, when the framer’s intent 
formulated constitutional disputes, they did not imagine that there would be 
constitutional disputes between provinces and the central government because they 
assumed that those kinds of constitutional disputes were not relevant in unitary states. 
That happens usually in federal state system where the states have their own 
independent position in the country. 
Thirdly, limitation of subjectum litis and lack of understanding of objectum litis have 
implied that the Constitutional Court could not take maximum role in resolving disputes 
on jurisdiction among state organs. This opinion stated by Maruara Siahaan, a former 
judge at the Constitutional Court. He argues that the Constitutional Court needs to 




From the foregoing analysis on some decisions of the Constitutional Court concerning 
disputes over jurisdiction among state organs that have been discussed previously, it 
may sum up some conclusion that firstly, the Constitutional Court has played a limited 
role in settling disputes concerning constitutional authority among state organs. This is 
because the small number of cases that registered to the Constitutional Court. In 
addition, there is lack of understanding of the citizens as well as the state organs on the 
subjectum litis and objectum litis of the petition pertaining to dispute over the jurisdiction 
among state organs.  
Secondly, however some achievements must be highly noted that through some 
decisions, the Constitutional Court have given contribution in consolidating democracy 
by keeping the working of checks and balances mechanism among state organs. Decision 
No. 1/SKLN-X/2012, Decision No.2/SKLN-X/2012 and Decision No. 3/SKLN-X/2012 
could be some examples. 
Thirdly, since it still has unclear concept of subjectum litis and objectum litis among 
petitioners, there were many petitions were not accepted. Lack of understanding of this 
subjectum litis and objectum litis also influence number of petitions that brought to the 
Constitutional Court. Therefore, the Constitutional Court Act has to define clearly 
classification of subjectum litis and objectum litis of the dispute. In this context, 
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